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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTION-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-
RELIGIOUS BELIEF PROTECTED UNDER FREE EXER-
CISE CLAUSE THOUGH NOT SHOWN TO BE DERIVED
FROM CARDINAL TENETS OF COMMON
FAITH-Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
Two clauses of the first amendment define the relation-
ship between government and religion: A government may not
act to either establish a religion or prohibit one's free exercise
of his beliefs.' The applicability of these clauses to any spe-
cific set of circumstances depends upon the Supreme Court's
concept of what constitutes a "religion" for first amendment
purposes. However, the Court, in the face of changing Ameri-
can religious thought, has not provided guidelines to distin-
guish between religion and non-religion. In a recent decision,
Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division,2 the United States Supreme Court addressed this is-
sue, holding that the first amendment guarantee of free exer-
cise extends to an individual's sincerely held "religious" belief
even if that belief is neither recognized as, nor rationally de-
rived from, a tenet of faith central to the practice of one's
religion.8
Petitioner Thomas applied for employment in November,
1975, at Blaw-Knox, a weapons manufacturer located in Indi-
ana. Through efforts of a fellow Jehovah's Witness, he imme-
diately secured a job in the roll foundry, a part of the plant
not engaged in weapons production. Approximately one year
later, the roll foundry was permanently closed and Thomas
0 1982 by Jeffrey H. Wong.
1. The clauses provide that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
3. Id. at 715-16.
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was transferred to a job making turrets for various weapons.
Uncomfortable with his new job, he unsuccessfully sought
transfer to another position where he would not be making
armaments. His discomfort resulted from a personal struggle
with the scriptural permissibility of his involvement in arma-
ments manufacturing. 4 Thomas turned for counsel to the fel-
low Jehovah's Witness responsible for his initial employment,
who replied that there was no scriptural problem. Thomas,
however, was not convinced.
Thomas' inability to reconcile the new job with his per-
sonal religious beliefs,' coupled with his concern over several
bomb scares at the plant,' and the impossibility of alternate
employment at Blaw-Knox, resulted in his voluntary termina-
tion of employment. His subsequent application for unem-
ployment compensation benefits was denied by the hearing
referee under the Indiana Employment Security Act require-
ment that a voluntary termination must be for "good cause in
connection with his work."'7 Although the referee concluded
that Thomas terminated for religious reasons,8 this ground
did not rise to the "good cause" requirement of the Indiana
statute. The Review Board, upheld the referee's finding and
denied Thomas benefits.
Petitioner Thomas appealed to the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals. The court of appeals, reversing the Review Board deci-
sion and awarding him benefits, held that the denial of bene-
fits violated Thomas' free exercise rights.9 Respondent Review
Board then appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court which va-
cated the appellate decision and denied benefits to Thomas. 0
The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the hearing record, rea-
soned that Thomas' beliefs were more "personal" than "reli-
4. Id. at 710. See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div.,
391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1979).
5. 450 U.S. at 710.
6. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 391 N.E.2d at
1132.
7. IND. CODE §22-4-15-1 (1976).
8. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 391 N.E.2d at
1132; See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 381 N.E.2d 888,
890 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). The record which appears in the lower court decisions does
not indicate a rationale behind the hearing referee's decision except that Thomas'
beliefs were concluded to be "religious" on the basis of his characterization.
9. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 381 N.E.2d at 895.
10. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 391 N.E.2d at
1127.
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gious" in nature because Thomas could neither articulate
them nor their religious basis, and concluded that they were
not protected under the free exercise clause."
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the United States Su-
preme Court, reversed the Indiana Supreme Court decision.
Applying a balancing test, the Court initially found that
Thomas' beliefs were protected by the free exercise clause of
the first amendment. The Court then weighed the burden im-
posed by the denial of benefits against alleged compelling
state interests and concluded that the withholding of unem-
ployment benefits violated the Petitioner's first amendment
rights by unjustifiably inhibiting his right to the free exercise
of his religion. 2
The Court began by inquiring whether Petitioner's beliefs
were entitled to protection under the free exercise clause."
Unlike the Indiana Supreme Court, the Court refused to eval-
uate the hearing transcript because the "narrow function of a
reviewing court ... is to determine whether there was an ap-
propriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because
of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his
religion."1 4 Rather the Court accepted, without question, the
hearing referee's conclusion that Thomas quit due to his reli-
gious convictions. Therefore, Thomas' action was entitled to
free exercise protection.
The Court next determined whether Petitioner's free ex-
ercise rights were burdened by state action. The Court previ-
ously held in Sherbert v. Verner1 ' that a denial of financial
benefits imposed the same burden upon free exercise of reli-
gion as would the imposition of a fine. Mrs. Sherbert was de-
nied unemployment benefits because she was fired for refus-
ing to work Saturdays. Saturday work was forbidden by a
cardinal tenet of her Sabbatarian faith. The United States Su-
preme Court agreed with her contention that the denial of
benefits violated her free exercise right. It concluded that
[t]he ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion, and forfeiting benefits, on the
11. 450 U.S. at 714. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security
Div., 391 N.E.2d at 1131-34.
12. 450 U.S. at 717-18.
13. Id. at 713-16.
14. Id. at 716.
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her re-
ligion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Govern-
mental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
imposed against appellant for her Sunday worship. '6
Following Sherbert, the Court in Thomas concluded that the
denial of unemployment benefits to plaintiff did burden his
first amendment rights.17
Respondent argued that the denial of benefits created
only an indirect burden, permissible in this case because the
legitimate state interest in providing public welfare was ad-
ministered by means of neutral objective standards. Again re-
ferring to Sherbert, the Court rejected these contentions. Not-
ing that a regulation neutral on its face may still offend
constitutional requirements in its application, the Court
found the Indiana statute unconstitutional as applied to
Thomas because it forced him to choose between fidelity to
his religious beliefs and the receipt of government-controlled
financial benefits. "While the compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.'
A state action infringing upon a constitutional right may
be permitted if the state is able to show that its action was
the least restrictive means to a compelling state interest.
However, this interest must be of the highest order to overbal-
ance a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion." Re-
spondent offered two reasons for denying Thomas' unemploy-
ment benefits: (1) to avoid the widespread unemployment and
the consequent burden on the fund resulting if people were
permitted to leave jobs for "personal" reasons, and (2) to
avoid a detailed probing by employers into job applicants' re-
ligious beliefs.2 0 The Court agreed that these were not unim-
portant considerations, implying that a factual showing on ei-
ther point could have affected the outcome. However, because
the evidence presented was insufficient to substantiate the
claims the Court dismissed both arguments.2
Finally, the Court addressed the Respondent's contention
16. Id. at 404.
17. 450 U.S. at 717-18.
18. Id. at 718.
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
20. 450 U.S. at 718-19.
21. Id. at 719.
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that to compel benefits to Thomas would involve the state in
fostering a religious faith in violation of the establishement
clause of the first amendment."" The Court, while agreeing
that Thomas would receive some "benefit" from his religion,
again followed Sherbert and held that this "benefit" only
manifests the tension between the establishment and free ex-
ercise clauses.2 s The Court concluded that this tension did not
rise to a violation of the establishment clause.
2 4
The Thomas decision represents a distinct departure
from historic first amendment law. The extent of this depar-
ture and its potential impact may be better understood after
an examination of the Court's traditional handling of free ex-
ercise issues.
In the nineteenth century "'religion' [for free exercise
purposes] referred to theistic notions respecting divinity, mo-
rality, and worship, and was recognized as legitimate"2 only
to the extent accepted by the majority in contemporary west-
ern culture. Because of this definition, unconventional or mi-
nority beliefs were often held to be outside the scope of first
amendment protection.2 6
Shifting trends in twentieth century American religious
thought, which have profoundly affected contemporary con-
cepts of religious experience, have forced the Court to
22. Id.
23. Id. The payment of benefits was characterized in Sherbert not as fostering
the "establishment" of a religion, but only as a reflection of "the governmental obli-
gation of neutrality in the face of religious differences. . . ." 374 U.S. at 409.
24. 450 U.S. at 719. This tension, notes Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, is the
result of the Court's historically unjustified and overly expansive reading of the free
exercise and establishment clauses. Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the one
hand, Sherbert and Thomas compel the state, on free exercise grounds, to award ben-
efits solely on the basis of Petitioner's religious beliefs. Yet, if the Court applied its
establishment standard to a similar situation, it would clearly find the provision un-
constitutional. This curious effect, argues Justice Rehnquist, could easily be remedied
by a Court retreat to the free exercise position enunciated in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961) (Free exercise clause is limited to legislation which makes unlawful
the exercise of religion) and the establishment position outlined by Justice Stewart in
his dissent in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ("Establish-
ment Clause is limited to 'government support of proselytizing activities of religious
sects by throwing the weight of secular authorit[ies] behind the dissemination of reli-
gious tenets.'" Id. at 314 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 450 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
25. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 826 (1978).
26. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormon practice of
polygamy not protected by first amendment).
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broaden its concept of "religion." 2 A distinction must be
made, however, between the religious belief and its practice.
"[T]he [first] [a]mendment embraces two concepts,-
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second-cannot be."'2 8 The
Constitution only protects a religious practice from direct gov-
ernment prohibition. For example, statutes regulating door-
to-door distribution of religious literature29 and solicitation of
funds 0 by imposing fines on the unlicensed were held uncon-
stitutional because they directly burdened the right to free ex-
ercise when less restrictive means of achieving the govern-
ment's objective of decreasing fraud were available.
Government actions which did not make unlawful a religious
practice, but which merely made the practice more "expen-
sive," 81 were held not to violate free exercise rights.2
The narrow reading of the free exercise clause applied in
earlier decisions was forsaken in Sherbert." There the Court
significantly enlarged free exercise protection by extending its
scope to include indirect burdens which result from the gov-
ernment's withholding of an economic benefit. 4 The Sherbert
holding was significant because, as one commentator states,
"for the first time the Court struck down a law as violative of
free exercise of religion even though it had an unquestionably
valid secular purpose and intention."86 In doing so, the Court
changed the focus of free exercise from the intended govern-
ment action to the conscience of the one affected by that ac-
tion." As a result, the state is now constitutionally compelled
to carve out an exception to its general rule for those whose
actions are religiously motivated. 87
The expanded protection resulting from the Sherbert de-
cision was not free from problems. By failing to provide guide-
27. L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 826-27.
28. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
29. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
30. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296.
31. 450 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. at 605).
32. E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 606-07.
33. 374 U.S. at 406.
34. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
35. Killilea, Standards for Expanding Freedom of Conscience, 34 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 531, 534 (1973).
36. Id.
37. 374 U.S. at 420.
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lines for distinguishing religion from non-religion, the Sher-
bert Court made it extremely difficult for lower courts to
consistently select from among "conscientious and capricious"
claims" for exemption. The importance of this threshold
problem must not be minimized. While outright prohibitions
rarely exist upon religious practice, indirect burdens which
make the practice difficult or expensive are common. If prac-
tices which are sincerely religious cannot be differentiated
from those which are not, the result is a flat exemption for
any belief or practice one chooses to label "religious." Such a
situation is inconsistent with the fundamental concept of or-
dered liberty3' because "every individual with sufficient zeal
would have the prerogative of deciding which laws would be
binding on him."4 0
The lack of explicit guidelines and the prospect of great
potential abuse had caused the lower courts to search for
guidelines implicit in cases decided under Sherbert.4'1 From
these decisions, one would have concluded that free exercise
protection was limited to beliefs which were central, basic and
essential to the religion of an organized group.42 The authority
used in determining the centrality of one's belief was the ten-
ets and precepts of his church."'
The use of the concept of centrality in Wisconsin v.
Yoder" is illustrative. Three Amish parents were prosecuted
for refusing to enroll their children in school beyond the
eighth-grade level in violation of a state law requiring their
attendance. In its approach to the free exercise question, the
Court, apparently addressing the problems raised by Sher-
bert, differentiated between philosophical and personal beliefs
and those grounded in religion, stating that only the latter
were protected by the first amendment.4' The Court then con-
38. Killilea, supra note 35, at 538.
39. See note 45, infra, and accompanying text.
40. Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 217, 271 (1966).
41. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
42. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 862-63; Galanter, supra note 40, at 217.
43. Note, Sincere Religious Belief, Though Not a Tenet of One's Church, or
Sect, Still Protected by First Amendment-Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir.
1980), 11 SEroN HALL L. REV. 220 (1981); See also, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Security Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979).
44. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
45. 406 U.S. at 215-16.
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ducted an extended inquiry into the Amish way of life and
religion, concluding that the Amish way of life was "one of
deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group,
4 6
and thus protected by free exercise. In Sherbert the belief in
question-a Sabbatarian may not work on Saturday-was also
central to the religion.47 In fact, before Thomas, all of the
cases in which a prohibition or indirect burden has been held
unconstitutional involved an activity which was at the core of
or essential to the religion in question."
One can see that the Thomas holding departs from prior
cases by rejecting the use of common church tenets as the ba-
sis for applying the "centrality" standard. This change had
the effect of extending again the scope of free exercise protec-
tion. A belief must no longer be shared commonly among
members of the same sect,4 9 as had been suggested by prior
cases. Nor, evidently, must one clearly articulate the belief or
its religious basis. 0 In fact, the belief need not be "acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others" in order to
merit first amendment protection.5
The Thomas extension of free exercise is not accompa-
nied by remedies for the problems created by Sherbert; the
limits of free exercise are not made clearer by this decision.
Rather, the distinction between religious and non-religious be-
liefs is obscured. Although the Court acknowledges the con-
ceivability of a claim so bizarre as not to be entitled to free
exercise protection," it offers no guidance to determine when
the limits of acceptability have been exceeded. Instead, it dis-
cards, without replacement, the centrality standard that has
Although a determination of what is a religious belief or practice enti-
tled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question,
the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a
whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims
because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values ... their claims would not rest on a religious basis. ...
[Plhilosophical and personal rather than religious [beliefs do] not rise to
the demand of the [rieligious [c]lauses.
Id.
46. Id. at 216.
47. 374 U.S. at 420 n.1.
48. See Galanter, supra note 40, at 276.
49. 450 U.S. at 715-16.
50. Id. at 715.
51. Id. at 714.
52. Id. at 715.
[Vol. 22242
THOMAS v. REVIEW BOARD
been consistently used by lower courts. At best, the present
lack of guidelines will only deepen the confusion and multiply
the inconsistency in the lower courts as they attempt to deter-
mine the limits of free exercise protection. Moreover, it is eas-
ily conceivable that this newly-broadened free exercise um-
brella will increase the instances in which fraudulent, spurious
or capricious "religious claims" are used in an attempt to ex-
empt oneself from a legitimate state requirement.
While the result reached in this case is properly sensitive
to the need of the individual to define religious "centrality"
by his own standards, the reasoning used in reaching this con-
clusion is unpersuasive. As precedent, the Court cited Sher-
bert and Yoder to support its finding that Thomas was enti-
tled to free exercise protection. These two decisions, relied
upon by lower courts and commentators alike, however, use
the tenets of organized religion as authority in determining
centrality." The Court offers neither additional precedent nor
reasoning to explain the rejection of its traditional view of
centrality.
The California practitioner should be aware that the
Thomas abandonment of the centrality standard may have
several interesting effects on California case law.
The Sherbert reasoning has been applied in California to
a line of cases involving the use of drugs as a part of religious
exercises. In People v. Woody," the California Supreme Court
used the tenets of the Native American Church as authority
in its application of the centrality of belief standard. It held a
state statute prohibiting the unauthorized possession of pe-
yote unconstitutional as applied to Native Americans who
used that drug as the central event in their religious rites.""
Defendants in subsequent marijuana-related cases" have
53. See text accompanying notes 41-43, supra.
54. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
55. The court said:
the test of constitutionality calls for an examination of the degree of
abridgement of religious freedom involved in each case. Peyote is the
sine qua non of defendant's faith. It is the sole means by which defend-
ants are able to experience their religion; without peyote, on the other
hand, defendants cannot practice their faith.
Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
56. E.g., People v. Collins, 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 78 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1969); Peo-
ple v. Werber, 19 Cal. App. 3d 598; 97 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1971); People v. Mullins, 50
Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975).
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attempted to avoid punishment under similar statutory provi-
sions by referring to Woody. The courts, though, have been
reluctant to find first amendment grounds unless the use of
marijuana was established to be so integral to a common reli-
gious faith that the prohibition of its use would result in a
virtual inhibition of the practice of that religion. No case since
Woody has been able to sustain this burden. In light of
Thomas, this difficult standard may fall and free exercise may
protect any religious belief merely characterized as central to
that individual's practice.
The Thomas decision, which discusses the content of a
"religious" belief, does not directly impinge on the California
unemployment cases. These cases have dealt with the applica-
bility of Sherbert when either the claim has an unquestion-
ably religious nature"7 or the sincerity of a benefit claimant's
belief is questionable.58  Although Thomas may signal a
greater willingness by the Burger Court to protect religious
claims, California courts may nevertheless feel indirect pres-
sure to uphold a wider variety of colorable claims. A brief
analysis of the decision in a leading California case, Hilde-
brand v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,' will
illustrate.
The Hildebrand facts are similar to those in Sherbert:
Hildebrand, a Sabbatarian, was discharged from her employ-
ment for refusing to work on Saturdays. Unlike the unques-
tionably sincere religious claim found in Sherbert, Hilde-
brand's claim was allegedly compromised by her acceptance of
the work despite her knowledge of the probable religious con-
flicts. Her application for unemployment insurance benefits
was denied because the religious grounds of her refusal to
work were considered insufficient to meet the California statu-
tory requirement. Hildebrand's knowledge proved to be criti-
cal since the California Supreme Court used the alleged com-
promise as the basis for holding Sherbert inapposite, thus
avoiding the constitutional question.
In his dissent, Justice Mosk charged that Petitioner's
Sherbert claims had been wrongfully rejected because the ma-
57. Rankins v. Comm'n on Professional Competence of Ducor Union School
Dist., 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979).
58. Hildebrand v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 765, 566 P.2d
1297, 140 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1977).
59. Id.
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jority had improperly inferred a lack of sincerity from Hilde-
brand's "compromise"; an inference made despite the trial
court's specific finding that her religious beliefs were
genuine."
The Hildebrand decision underscores the tendency of
courts in several states to narrowly construe the Sherbert
holding.6 1 The Thomas decision could indirectly force Califor-
nia and other jurisdictions, through the prospect of federal re-
view, to broaden their willingness to apply Sherbert to unem-
ployment claims. But the extent to which California policy
will change presents a provocative question which bears close
watch in light of the mixed signals given by the Burger Court
decisions in Sherbert, Thomas and, more recently, Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. " In
Heffron, the court upheld the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute regulating the distribution of literature by members of the
Hari Krishna religious cult-conceded to be a bona fide reli-
gious practice-against their first amendment challenge. De-
spite the uncertain strength of the new Burger Court outlook,
it is likely that the California courts will display a greater hes-
itancy before ruling against free exercise claimants. Future
"Hildebrands" will undoubtedly benefit from a set of state
court values adjusted to reflect the new United States Su-
preme Court position.
The United States Supreme Court in Thomas held that
the first amendment free exercise clause protects an individ-
ual's religious beliefs even though they are neither shown to
be derived from, nor related to, a religion's central tenets. By
failing, however, to provide definitive guidelines to distinguish
the religious from the non-religious, the Court has opened the
door to further confusion in the lower courts and an increase
in fraudulent "religious" claims for exemption from legitimate
state laws.
Jeffrey H. Wong
60. Id. at 773-76, 566 P.2d at 1301-02, 140 Col. Rptr. at 155-57 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
61. See, Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n of Colo., 618 P.2d 738 (1980); Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 391 N.E.2d at 1127, 1132 (1979);
Unemplbyment Compensation Bd. of Rev. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 471, 352
A.2d 581 (1976); Levold v. Employment Security Dep't, 24 Wash. App. 472, 604 P.2d
175 (1979).
62. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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COMMUNITY PROPERTY-VESTED AND MATURED
RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDI-
ATE DISTRIBUTION AT OPTION OF NONEMPLOYED
SPOUSE-In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629
P.2d 1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981).
The fourteen-year marriage of Vera and Earl Gillmore
ended in a dissolution action before a San Diego Superior
Court on January 19, 1979. Vera received $225 per month
child support and $100 per month spousal support. She also
received one half of the community property, in keeping with
California law,1 with a single exception: rather than divide
Earl's interest in his retirement plan with his employer, Pa-
cific Telephone Company, the court exercised its broad discre-
tion' by retaining jurisdiction over the pension fund.3 In July
1979, Vera requested a court order distributing the pension
benefits as of the date Earl became eligible to retire." Earl re-
sponded with a request for modified spousal and child sup-
port. The trial court denied the requests of both parties, hold-
ing that it was within the court's discretion to retain
jurisdiction over the benefits and to delay their distribution
until the time of Earl's actual retirement.
The California Supreme Court reversed,5 holding that the
© 1982 by Bruce Robertson
1. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1981) provides in pertinent part that, except in
certain limited circumstances, "the court shall . . . divide the community property
and the quasi-community property of the parties . . . equally."
Community property is defined as all property earned by either spouse during
the marriage. Quasi-community property is property acquired by either spouse while
domiciled elsewhere "which would have been community property if the spouse who
acquired the property had been domiciled in [California] at the time of acquisition."
Id. § 4803 (West Supp. 1981).
2. See In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr.
423 (1979) (trial courts have considerable latitude in determining an "essentially
equal" distribution of community assets).
3. 29 Cal. 3d at 421, 629 P.2d at 3, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
4. The defendant became eligible to retire in April 1979 but represented that he
was a "healthy, active man" in his early fifties and intended to work for some time.
29 Cal.3d at 422, 629 P.2d at 3, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
5. In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1981). Chief Justice Bird delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, composed of
Justice Mosk, Justice Richardson, Justice Newman, and two justices assigned by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council, Justice Barry-Deal and Justice Kongsgaard.
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trial court had abused its discretion by not ordering immedi-
ate distribution of Vera's share of all community assets. The
Gillmore court reaffirmed its holding in In re Marriage of
Brown' that retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested,
matured or immature,8 earned by a spouse during marriage
are community property and are subject to equal division
upon the dissolution of the marriage.' The central issue before
the court was not the division of the retirement benefits,"° but
the timing of the distribution of those benefits. The court
held that Earl could neither deprive Vera of an equal share of
the community's interest by postponing his retirement, a deci-
sion entirely within his control, 1 nor could he postpone her
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1981); note 1 supra.
7. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
8. In Brown the court discussed these distinctions in detail:
"Some decisions that discuss pension rights, but do not involve division
of marital property, describe a pension right as 'vested' if the employer
cannot unilaterally repudiate that right without terminating the employ-
ment relationship [citations omitted] . . . . In divorce and dissolution
cases following French v. French [17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941)],
however, the term 'vested' has acquired a special meaning: it refers to a
pension right which is not subject to a condition of forfeiture if the em-
ployment relationship terminates before retirement."
15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
A retirement benefit becomes "matured" when the employee has an uncondi-
tional right to payment, i.e., when all conditions precedent to payment have taken
place or are under the control of the employee. 29 Cal. 3d at 422 n.2, 629 P.2d at 3
n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 495 n.2. See generally Brandt, The Identification and Division
of Intangible Community Property: Slicing the Invisible Pie, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 26, 29-
31 (1973).
9. 29 Cal. 3d at 423, 629 P.2d at 4, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 496. In In re Marriage of
Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974), the court concluded
that California's community property law was applicable to federal military retire-
ment. The United States Supreme Court has since ruled that application of Califor-
nia community property law to military retirement is inconsistent with federal law,
thus creating a major area of exception. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981),
101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
10. Following a divorce, when the employed spouse continues to work until re-
tirement, the monthly benefits must be divided between the spouses according to the
rule set forth in In re Marriage of Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181, 134 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1976) and In re Marriage of Anderson, 64 Cal. App. 3d 36, 134 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1976).
Under this rule the employed spouse receives a sum equal to one half of the ratio
between the years of marriage to the date of separation divided by the number of
years of employment. Hardie, Pay Now or Pay Later: Alternatives in the Disposition
of Retirement Benefits on Divorce, 53 STATE BAR J. 106, 108 n.15 (1978).
11. In Gillmore the court relied upon the principle briefly considered in Waite
v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 472, 492 P.2d 13, 20, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332 (1972) and fully
articulated in In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 650, 115 Cal. Rptr.
184, 190 (1974), and in In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 786, 582 P.2d 96,
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control, use, and enjoyment of those assets.' As an employee
spouse, however, Earl retained the right to change or termi-
nate his employment and to agree to modifications in his re-
tirement benefits or the nature of those benefits so long as his
decisions did not impair the interest of his nonemployee
spouse.'3 Vera must be compensated for any decision which
impairs her interest in the retirement benefits."
Earl argued, alternatively, that if Vera was entitled to im-
mediate distribution of the fund, she should be compensated
through increased alimony. The court reaffirmed its earlier
holding" that adjustments in alimony, a matter of judicial
discretion, do not mitigate the hardship caused by a denial of
a community property interest which is a matter of right.' s
The employee spouse, however, may seek an adjustment in al-
imony if the immediate distribution of known assets causes a
modification in relative economic standing. 7 The court left
the exact method of distribution to the discretion of the trial
court on remand.' 8
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Civil Code
section 48001' to determine that all community property is
subject to division upon the dissolution of the marriage. Thus,
the trial court was compelled to distribute the known retire-
ment benefits in January 1979. At that time the community
interest in the pension fund was known since the interest had
vested, regardless of the fact that it had not matured.2 0 The
court noted that the nonemployee spouse had the right to de-
cide whether to receive the funds immediately or allow the
100, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1978) that a spouse may not defeat the community interest
of the other spouse by relying on or invoking a condition wholly within his own
control.
12. 29 Cal. 3d at 424, 629 P.2d at 4, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
13. Id. at 425, 629 P.2d at 6, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
14. Id. at 426, 629 P.2d at 6, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
15. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr.
at 639 (1976); In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 787 n.8, 585 P.2d at 101 n.8,
148 Cal. Rptr. 14 n.8 (1978).
16. 29 Cal. 3d at 427, 629 P.2d at 7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
17. "Of course, the [respondent] spouse may seek a prospective modification of
his or her support payments in light of any new partition of an asset not previously
adjudicated." Id. at 428 n.8, 629 P.2d at 7 n.8, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 499 n.8 (quoting
Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 332 n.8, 605 P.2d 10, 14 n.8, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506
n.8).
18. 29 Cal. 3d at 429, 629 P.2d at 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
19. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West 1981).
20. See note 8 supra.
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funds to remain in the retirement plan, increasing in value
along with the funds belonging to the employee spouse.2
The Gilimore court also relied upon the basic concept of
fairness in requiring immediate distribution at the election of
the nonemployee spouse. If Earl retained control of the entire
fund, he could defeat the interest of Vera if he died before
retirement. 22 Furthermore, in arguing that the trial court's
ruling provided for an equal distribution, Earl overlooked the
fact that control of an asset is a part of its value. Thus, Earl's
determination of the timing of distribution of the retirement
funds increased the value of his interest over Vera's interest.2
Control of an asset may become especially important during
retirement years when a person's chief or, indeed, only asset
may be money in a pension fund. Thus, to a retired person, a
future interest in a pension fund may be of far less value than
a present receipt of the equivalent amount of cash.
Earl's major contention was that Vera's demand for im-
mediate distribution of the retirement funds would force him
into early retirement. The court responded that Earl was free
to retire or continue working as he wished. Should he con-
tinue working, however, he must compensate Vera for her
share of the retirement account.24 In making the analysis, the
court compared the retirement fund to a house owned as com-
munity property by a divorcing couple. If one spouse chooses
to keep the house, he must compensate the other party.' 5
The respondent further argued that the nonemployee
spouse should be required to demonstrate financial need to
21. 29 Cal. 3d at 428, 629 P.2d at 7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 499. See also note 8 supra.
22. Id. at 424, 629 P.2d at 4, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
23. Id. n.4.
24. The California Supreme Court found that the trial court was in error in not
awarding the retirement funds entirely to Earl and offsetting Vera's share against
another community asset. Id. at 428, 629 P.2d at 7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 499 (citing In re
Marriage of Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679, 688-89, 566 P.2d 249, 253-54, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615,
619-20 (1977); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848 n.10, 544 P.2d at 567 n.10,
126 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.10; Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 46, 473
P.2d 765, 774, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 70 (1978)). See also In re Marriage of Chala, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 996, 1002, 155 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607-08 (1979) (identifying as error the equali-
zation of a community property division by adjustments to alimony); In re Marriage
of Brigden, 80 Cal. App. 3d 380, 390, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716, 723 (1978) (defining the
"substantially equal" provision of the code).
25. 29 Cal. 3d at 427, 629 P.2d at 6, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 498. See also In re Mar-
riage of Herrmann, 48 Cal. App. 3d 361, 367, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1978) (possibly
an abuse of discretion not to order immediate cash distribution of the assets repre-
sented by a residence, even if delay benefitted a minor child).
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justify immediate distribution of the benefits.' The court
stated that the financial equities of the parties may be consid-
ered in determining spousal support only after all community
property has been divided.
The court found no merit whatsoever in the respondent's
constitutional argument that the appellant's request would
constitute a taking of separate property.27
In the final analysis, the guidelines for trial courts are
now clear. Courts should make an effort to award retirement
funds to an employee spouse, offsetting the nonemployee
spouse's interest with other community assets. Where such a
solution is not possible or fair, vested and matured benefits
are subject to immediate distribution at the election of the
nonemployee spouse.
The decision in Gilimore is the logical extension of previ-
ous California Supreme Court decisions. In 1976 the court in
In re Marriage of Brown"5 overruled French v. French"9 which
held that a nonvested pension right was not a property right
but a mere expectation and, thus, not a community asset sub-
ject to division upon dissolution of the marriage. The court in
Brown ruled that pension rights, vested or not, are property
rights and, to the extent that the funds were earned during
the marriage, are a community asset subject to division.30 The
line of cases stemming from Brown represents an unswerving
commitment to the "protective philosophy of the community
property law."3 1 The discretion of trial courts to effect a prac-
tical division of property as found in In re Marriage of Con-
nolly 82 is strictly circumscribed by the requirements of equal-
ity found in Civil Code section 4800. In 1978 the court, in In
re Marriage of Stenquist,as disallowed a husband's efforts to
26. 29 Cal. 3d at 427, 629 P.2d at 7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
27. Id. n.7. The court indicated that quite the opposite of a taking of separate
property might be the case. One commentator characterized the community as being
penalized by subsidizing the salary of a spouse who continues to work though eligible
for retirement. Id. See Brown, In re Marriage of Stenquist: Tracing the Community
of Interest in Pension Rights Altered by Spousal Election, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 856
(1979).
28. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
29. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
30. 15 Cal. 3d at 847, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
31. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 782, 582 P.2d 96, 98, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 9, 11 (1978).
32. 23 Cal. 3d 590, 603, 591 P.2d 911, 917, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423, 430 (1979).
33. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
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manipulate the amount of community property by changing
the classification of military pension funds to disablement
funds,3 ' underscoring its commitment to equal division of
community assets. In In re Marriage of Olson35 the court reaf-
firmed Brown in holding that it is an abuse of discretion for a
trial court to improperly classify community property or fail
to divide it equally. 6 The Gillmore court cites In re Marriage
of Luciano37 as being directly on point and quotes that deci-
sion in pertinent part:
'[T]o uphold the trial court's ruling as to the time Doro-
thy is to commence receiving her portion of this commu-
nity asset would give Ferdinand the option of determin-
ing the receipt by Dorothy of her own property which
would be basically unfair. The employee spouse cannot by
election defeat the nonemployee spouse's interest in the
community property by relying on a condition solely
within the employee spouse's control .... A proper order
for a trial court to make in these circumstances is that the
nonemployee spouse is the one who has the choice as to
when his or her share of the pension shall begin.'"
The issue of the timing of the distribution of pension
plan assets has been recognized to be a problem area since the
seminal Brown decision.39 With its holding in Gillmore, the
California Supreme Court resolved a major uncertainty in
California community property law. The central inquiry now
turns to the federal pension programs of California residents.
On June 26, 1981, the United .States Supreme Court held in
34. Id. at 786, 582 P.2d at 100, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13. The general rule is that a
retirement pension is community property to the extent that it was established dur-
ing the marriage. Disability pay, however, when it is distinguishable from a retire-
ment pension, is separate property. Id. at 784, 582 P.2d at 99, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 12; In
re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975); In re
Marriage of Loehr, 13 Cal. 3d 465, 531 P.2d 425, 119 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1975). See also
Brown, supra note 27.
35. 27 Cal. 3d 414, 612 P.2d 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980).
36. Id. at 422, 612 P.2d at 914, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
37. 104 Cal. App. 3d 956, 164 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1980).
38. 29 Cal. 3d at 424-25, 629 P.2d at 5, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 497 (quoting 104 Cal.
App. 3d at 960, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 95) (emphasis in original). The Gillmore court noted
that the dictum of In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 311, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 792, 797 (1976) is disapproved to the extent it suggests the employee spouse can
control the time at which retirement payments to the nonemployee spouse will begin.
29 Cal. 3d at 425 n.5, 629 P.2d at 5 n.5, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 497 n.5. See generally
Hardie, supra note 10.
39. See generally Hardie, supra note 10.
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McCarty v. McCarty4° that the federal program of military re-
tirement preempted state community property laws and that
the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution precluded a
trial court from awarding the former wife of a military officer
a portion of that retirement fund as community property. At
the time of the wife's suit, the officer was eligible for retire-
ment. The case turns largely on congressional intent in estab-
lishing a "personal entitlement" to military pensions and on
the special nature of retirement from the military. The Court
left unresolved the issue of whether military retirement is de-
ferred compensation as it is under the California rule,' 1 but it
clearly disallowed the rule of In re Marriage of Fithian42
where the California Supreme Court held that there was "no
evidence that the application of California community prop-
erty law interferes in any way with the administration or goals
of the federal military retirement system. '43
The extent to which McCarty has eroded the vitality of
Brown and its progeny is uncertain. Gillmore, however, repre-
sents a major axiom in the logic of California community
property law whenever that concept is applied.
Bruce Robertson
40. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
41. Id. at 223 n.16.
42. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
43. Id. at 604, 517 P.2d at 457, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 377.

DENATURALIZATION AND MATERIALITY AT THE
VISA APPLICATION STAGE-Fedorenko v. United States,
449 U.S. 490 (1981).
In 1949, Feodor Fedorenko, petitioner, obtained a visa
under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948' and immigrated to
the United States where he has lived since.' Petitioner falsi-
fied his application under the Act by lying about his wartime
activities.' In 1970, after twenty-one years of residing in the
United States, petitioner applied for and was granted natural-
0 1982 by Emma Pefia
1. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2, 62 Stat. 1009 [herein-
after DPA or Act]. The Act enabled refugees driven from their homelands by World
War II to migrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigration
quotas. It incorporated the definition of "refugees or displaced persons" contained in
Annex I, Part II, of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (of
the United Nations) (IRO). See id. at 3051-52.
The borrowed portion of the IRO Constitution that now appears in the Act pro-
vides that the following persons would not be eligible for refugee or displaced person
status:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors;
2. Any other person who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of
countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the out-
break of the second world war in their operations against the
United Nations.
Id.
2. Following his arrival to the United States, petitioner worked in Connecticut
for twenty-one years until his retirement and then moved to Miami Beach, Florida.
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
3. Petitioner was born in the Ukraine in Russia in 1907, was drafted into the
Russian army in June, 1941, and was captured by the Germans shortly after the Ger-
man invasion of Russia. After being moved to a series of prisoner-of-war camps, peti-
tioner was transferred to the German camp at Travnicki in Poland where he received
training as a concentration camp guard. In 1942, he was transferred to the Nazi con-
centration camp at Treblinka where he served as an armed guard.
In 1943, when the camp was closed, petitioner was transferred to Danzig and
then to Poelitz where he continued to serve as an armed guard. Petitioner was even-
tually transferred to Hamburg where he was able to pass as a civilian when the Brit-
ish took over in 1945. For the next four years petitioner worked as a laborer in
Germany.
In 1949 petitioner applied for a visa to the United States under the DPA. In his
application petitioner stated that he had been born in Sarny, Poland and had worked
as a farmer from 1937 to March 1942, when he was deported to Germany and forced
to work in a factory in Poelitz until the end of the war when he fled to Hamburg. Id.
at 900-01, 910-11.
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ization on the basis of the information provided in his appli-
cation for a visa.4
In 1977, seven years after petitioner obtained his citizen-
ship, the United States Government filed an action to revoke
petitioner's citizenship under section 340(a) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 19521 charging that petitioner had
(1) lied in his application for a visa; (2) concealed his wartime
activities as a concentration camp guard at Treblinka, Poland;
(3) committed crimes or atrocities against his inmates at
Treblinka; and (4) lacked the moral character necessary to be-
come an American citizen.6
The district court, in United States v. Fedorenko,7 relied
on the materiality standard announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Chaunt v. United States8 and found that
the government had not proved by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidence that petitioner's false statements were
material to the denial of citizenship within the meaning of the
denaturalizaton statute' and that, even if petitioner's state-
ments were found to be material, equitable and mitigating cir-
cumstances required that he be permitted to retain his
4. Id.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorney . . . to institute pro-
ceedings ... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order
admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of nat-
uralization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturaliza-
tion were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a mate-
rial fact or by willful misrepresentation. .. ."
6. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 897-98 (S.D. Fla 1978).
7. Id.
8. 364 U.S. 350 (1960). The Chaunt test provides that the government must
prove by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence (1) that the true facts sup-
pressed, which if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their
disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discov-
ery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship. Id. at 354.
9. See note 5 supra. The provision applies only to willful misrepresentation of a
material fact. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). On the issue of mate-
riality, the district court interpreted the second test of Chaunt as requiring the gov-
ernment to prove with certainty that petitioner would not have been naturalized if
the true facts had been known. 455 F. Supp. at 916. The district court concluded that
knowledge of petitioner's true birth place would not in and of itself justify denial of
citizenship because Ukrainians were not excluded per se. Id. at 915. See note 5 supra.
The definition of displaced persons would include Ukrainians who were forced from
their homelands during the German invasion of Russia. The district court also con-
cluded that since it had found that petitioner had not committed crimes or atrocities
and that his service as an armed guard had been involuntary, the government had not
proved the petitioner's visa would have been denied. 455 F. Supp. at 916.
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citizenship. ' °
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that petitioner
had procured his citizenship by willful and material misrepre-
sentation of the true facts." In so holding, the court of ap-
peals agreed that Chaunt was controlling, but rejected the
district court's interpretation of the test. The court of appeals
further held that the district court erred in setting aside the
judgment on the basis of equitable considerations because the
court did not have the authority to ignore petitioner's ineligi-
bility for citizenship.'2
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in
Fedorenko v. United States,'" affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals and held that petitioner was ineligible for a
visa under the DPA and that the district court lacked the dis-
cretion to set aside the judgment on equitable grounds.
The Court began its discussion by establishing a frame-
work for its analysis. The Court looked at what it considered
10. 455 F. Supp. at 921. The court said,
[nievertheless, where defendant has been a responsible citizen and resi-
dent for twenty-nine years, and the record as to his conduct thirty-five
years ago is inconclusive, the court finds that the equities should be
weighed in favor of defendant.
Id. at 920-21. The district court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not been
faced with the question of whether a district court has the discretion to consider the
equities involved in determining whether citizenship should be revoked after so many
years. Id. at 919. It observed, however, that the lower courts have exercised discretion
in determining whether citizenship should be granted and have gone beyond the mere
technicalities of the law in order " 'to ameliorate hardship and injustice which other-
wise would result from a strict and technical application of the law.'" Id. (quoting
Wadmar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 329 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir.
1964)).
11. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 952-53 (5th Cir. 1979). The court
of appeals found that the American authorities would have conducted an investiga-
tion if petitioner had disclosed that he had served as an armed guard at Treblinka.
Based on testimony by an expert witness, Kempton Jenkins, who had served as an
American vice-consul in Germany administering the Displaced Persons Act, and
other evidence presented by the government, an investigation might have resulted in
a denial of petitioner's visa. Id. at 952-53.
12. Id. at 954. The court of appeals indicated that "[t]here is a crucial distinc-
tion between a district court's authority to grant citizenship and its authority to re-
voke citizenship." Id. at 953-54. The courts must determine if the individual meets
the requirements for naturalization and should exercise discretion in making such a
determination. Once the individual's ineligibility has been determined, however, the
denaturalization statute does not grant the district court the discretion to ignore the
defect. Id. at 954. (citing United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474 (1917)). See
note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
13. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
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two lines of cases. From one line, it recognized the graveness
of denaturalization: "[tihe right to acquire American citizen-
ship is a precious one, and . . . once citizenship has been ac-
quired, its loss can have severe and unsettling conse-
quences."'" Given such severity, the Court emphasized and
enunciated the principle expounded in Schneiderman v.
United States"' where the Court held that in order to justify
revocation of naturalization, "the burden of proof is upon the
government to prove its case by clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing evidence. . . .[M]ere preponderance of the evidence
which leaves the issue in doubt will not suffice."' 6
From the second line of cases, the Court acknowledged
that the authority to prescribe rules for naturalization rests
with Congress alone."' The Court's earliest denaturalization
cases reflect a judicial concern for strict compliance with stat-
utory requirements.1 8 The Court considered that these two
lines of cases were consistent with its "recognition of the im-
portance of the issues that are at stake-for the citizen as well
as the government-in a denaturalization proceeding." 1'
The Court chose to adhere to the earlier line of cases and,
reinforcing the notion that the rule of strict construction is to
be applied to the Immigration and Nationality Act,"0 pro-
ceeded to analyze the DPA. The Court concluded that the
plain language of the Act compelled it to find that the DPA
rendered all those who assisted in the prosecution of civilians,
whether voluntarily or not, ineligible for a visa."1
Based on vice-consul Jenkin's testimony and the fact that
there was no dispute that petitioner had lied," the Court held
14. Id. at 505.
15. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
16. Id. at 158. See also Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 (1946);
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944); United States v. Marasilis,
142 F. Supp. 697, 699 (W.D. Mich. 1956).
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 empowers Congress to "establish a uniform Rule
of Naturalization."
18. See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 22 (1928); United States v. Ness,
245 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327 (1917); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474-75
(1917); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 240 (1912).
19. 449 U.S. at 507.
20. Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 19 (1928). The Act provides in perti-
nent part: [A]lU immigration laws . . .shall be applicable to . . .eligible displaced
persons who apply to be or who are admitted into the United States pursuant to this
Act." DPA, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1013 (1948).
21. But see note 66 infra, and accompanying text. 449 U.S. at 512.
22. Id. at 510-11 n.31.
[Vol. 22
FEDORENKO v. U.S.
that petitioner had made willful misrepresentations 23 and that
knowledge of the true facts would have made him ineligible
for a visa as a matter of law.2' The Court reasoned that, as a
matter of logical progression, petitioner's certificate of citizen-
ship was rendered revocable as "illegally procured" under the
Naturalization Act because he had failed to comply with stat-
utory prerequisites established by Congress.2
The second issue before the Court was whether the dis-
trict court should be allowed the discretion to set aside the
judgment due to mitigating and equitable considerations.
Considering that courts appropriately exercise discretion in
determining whether an applicant meets the requirements for
immigration and naturalization, the Court rejected the district
court's contention that logically and equitably such discretion
should also be available in denaturalization proceedings.2 The
Court pointed out that in United States v. Ness27 denaturali-
zation of an individual was ordered, even though he met the
qualifications for citizenship, because he had failed to file a
certificate of arrival as required by law.2 8 The Court reiterated
what was said in United States v. Ginsberg,29 that the courts
are without discretion to sanction changes or modifications.
The Court admitted that a denaturalization proceeding is a
suit in equity, 0 but, in accordance with the above precedent,
it concluded that "limited discretion does not include the au-
thority to excuse illegal or fraudulent procurement of citizen-
ship." ' Therefore, the Court ordered that petitioner's citizen-
ship be revoked. 2
In finding that petitioner was, as a matter of law, ineligi-
23. 449 U.S. at 507. The Court noted "[t]hat petitioner gave these false state-
ments because he was motivated by fear of repatriation to the Soviet Union indicates
that he understood that disclosing the truth would have affected his chances of being
admitted to the United States and confirms that his misrepresentation was willful."
See also, 455 F. Supp. at 914. But see note 9 supra.
24. 449 U.S. at 509.
25. Id. at 514-16, nn. 36-38.
26. Id. at 517.
27. 245 U.S. 319 (1917).
28. Id.
29. 243 U.S. 472 (1917). See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
30. 449 U.S. at 516.
31. Id. at 517.
32. Id. Once petitioner is divested of his citizenship, he is restored to his former
status of alienage and is subject to deportation. The government must bring a sepa-
rate action under the deportation statute. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976).
19821
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ble for a visa under the DPA, the Court found it unnecessary
to reach the issue of Chaunt's relevancy regarding initial en-
try into the United States"3 and thereby failed to give a
proper interpretation of Chaunt.
An examination of Chaunt is pertinent in understanding
Fedorenko's impact in denaturalization proceedings. Begin-
ning with Schneiderman in 1943, and until 1960, the courts
invariably held that by a showing that the government's in-
vestigative process had been thwarted, the government would
have proved by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that an individual's false statements were material.8 4 In 1960,
the United States Supreme Court, disagreeing with the broad
and general view of prior cases, presented a new standard in
Chaunt v. United States.3
Peter Chaunt had failed to reveal prior arrests," but had
disclosed his membership in an allegedly communist organiza-
tion.3 7 The government, nevertheless, contended that disclo-
sure of the arrests would have led to an investigation which
would have resulted in his denial of citizenship. 8
33. 449 U.S. at 509.
34. United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (D. Md. 1957); United
States v. Genovese, 133 F. Supp. 820, 829 (D. N.J. 1955), aff'd sub noma.; United
States v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956).
Cf. United States v. Anastasio, 226 F.2d 912, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 931 (1956) (Investigation was found not to have been prevented because the
examiner who approved the defendant's petition had defendant's file with record of
previous arrests concealed by defendant). See generally United States v. Galato, 171
F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Pa. 1959); United States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd per curiam, 232 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1956).
35. 364 U.S. at 350.
36. Id. Chaunt had been arrested for distributing hand bills in violation of an
ordinance, for making a public demonstration in violation of park regulations and for
a general breach of the peace. The first charge was dropped; he received a suspended
sentence for the second; he was convicted for the third but the charge was "nolled"
on appeal. The Court concluded that these crimes were of "slight consequence" and
not the type of activity that would disqualify one for citizenship. Id. at 354.
37. Id. In 1929 Chaunt allegedly had been an organizer for the Communist
Party in Connecticut. Chaunt disclosed that he had been a member of the Interna-
tional Workers' Order. Id. at 355. The Court found that the government suspected
the IWO was controlled by the Communist Party when it granted Chaunt's petition
for naturalization in 1940. Id.
38. This information would in turn reveal that Chaunt was unattached to the
principles of the Constitution because he belonged to a communist organization. See
note 37 supra. One of the prerequisites for citizenship is that an individual must have
been of "good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976).
FEDORENKO v. U.S.
Emphasizing the severity of denaturalization, the Court
acknowledged that while a
[f]ull and truthful response to all relevant questions re-
quired by the naturalization procedure is, of course, to be
exacted, and temporizing with the truth must be vigor-
ously discouraged. . .[i]n view of the grave consequences
to the citizen, naturalization decrees are not lightly to be
set aside.89
Accordingly, the Court held that Chaunt should not be
denaturalized, noting the lack of "clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing" evidence necessary to prove
(1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would
have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their dis-
closure might have been useful in an investigation possi-
bly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting de-
nial of citizenship. 0
Confusion as to the meaning of the second test arose im-
mediately. Justice Clark, dissenting in Chaunt, interpreted
the test to require that falsification forestalled an investiga-
tion which might have resulted in denial of petitioner's appli-
cation for citizenship.4 1 As the district court noted in
Fedorenko,41 the word "possibly" used in the Chaunt test-
"possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship- 4 8 _ can be interpreted to modify the en-
tire phrase so that the facts warranting denial need only be a
possibility." Alternatively, the word "possibly" could modify
only the first part of the phrase requiring certain denial of
citizenship. This ambiguity has caused inconsistent applica-
tion of Chaunt."
While Chaunt involved denaturalization, the lower courts
have unquestionably applied it in deportation proceedings
39. 364 U.S. at 352-53.
40. Id. at 355.
41. Id. at 357 (Clark, J., dissenting).
42. 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
43. Id. at 915-16.
44. Id.
45. See La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1974) (the Ninth
Circuit stated that under Chaunt, a misrepresented or concealed fact is not material
unless the truth would have justified a refusal to issue a visa); See Langhammer v.
Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961); Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.
1955) (under Chaunt, materiality exists if the truth might have led to further inquiry
and the discovery of facts warranting exclusion).
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when the false statements arise at the time of applying for a
visa.4 Consequently, the district court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit assumed that Chaunt was control-
ling in Fedorenko.47
Ostensibly, Chaunt should be controlling in Fedorenko.
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished Chaunt from the
instant case pointing out that Chaunt had failed to reveal
facts when applying for citizenship, while petitioner's false
statements arose at the time of the initial entry into the
United States.4" Therefore, the Court concluded that it was
not so obvious, as the lower courts had presupposed, that
Chaunt should be controlling.4 9
The Court, however, did not address the issue of
Chaunt's relevancy when seeking admission into the United
States. In failing to do so, the Court enhanced the confusion
engendered by Chaunt. First, the Court gave no explanation
for its refusal to apply Chaunt, yet the standard of materiality
it adopted for deportation review, namely, that "disclosure of
the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a
visa,'' 50 bears a strong resemblance to the first test of
Chaunt.5' The Court thus created a multiple standard for de-
naturalization proceedings.
Second, the inconsistent application of the second test in
Chaunt still exists. The lower courts have disagreed on the
interpretation. One view stresses the interest of the individual
in retaining his citizenship,52 while the other stresses the in-
terest of the government in supervising the naturalization
46. See notes 52-70, infra, and accompanying text.
47. U.S. v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Fedorenko, 455 F.
Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
48. 449 U.S. at 508-09.
49. Id. at 508.
50. Id. at 509.
51. Chaunt's first test provides: "that facts were suppressed which, if known,
would have warranted denial of citizenship .. " 364 U.S. at 355.
52. In accord with Schneiderman and its line of cases, the Ninth and Third
Circuits have interpreted Chaunt to provide a stringent standard in order to safe-
guard the right of the individual to retain his citizenship. La Madrid-Peraza v. INS,
492 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 653 (9th
Cir. 1962). In these cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, under
Chaunt, a fact suppressed or misstated is not material unless the truth would have
justified denial of citizenship. Similarly, in United States v. Reila, 337 F.2d 986 (3d
Cir. .1964), the court cited Chaunt as holding that false statements are material if
they resulted in the suppression of facts which if known would have warranted denial
of citizenship. Id. at 988-89.
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process."
The district court in Fedorenko acknowledged that the
second test of Chaunt was ambiguous and lent itself to differ-
ent interpretations." It pointed out, however, that if the gov-
ernment was correct in its interpretation, the Court in Chaunt
would have included "might" in its wording of the test to
most appropriately reflect the Court's intent." Consequently,
the Ninth Circuit was correct in its interpretation of the test;
discovery of ultimate facts would have resulted in denial of
citizenship.'
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, while also noting that the test was ambiguous, re-
jected the district court's contention and adopted the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the test as correct; that the ulti-
mate facts might have warranted denial of citizenship.
Dissention exists among the Court itself. While the fol-
lowing Justices agree that Chaunt should be controlling, each
would have the Court reconsider Fedorenko in light of their
own particular interpretation of Chaunt. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the opinion, agreed with the result of the Court
but not with its analysis. In his view, Chaunt should apply
because such a rigorous standard is necessary in order to pro-
tect the rights of the naturalized citizen. 8 In accord with his
view, Justice Blackmun adopted the district court's interpre-
tation of Chaunt, noting that to adhere to the court of ap-
peals' interpretation would result in leaving the naturalized
citizen with "nothing more than citizenship in attenuated, if
not suspended, animation."" He then concluded that the gov-
53. In keeping with protecting the government's interest in conducting an in-
vestigation in both immigration and denaturalization proceedings, the First and Sec-
ond Circuits have accorded Chaunt a less stringent interpretation. United States v.
Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963). The Second
Circuit held that a fact suppressed or misstated that would not, in and of itself, have
warranted denial of citizenship is material nonetheless if its disclosure would have led
the government to conduct an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts justify-
ing denial of citizenship. Id. at 118; see also Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806, 807 (6th
Cir. 1966); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961). These cases,
while dealing with citizenship, are actually deportation cases.
54. 455 F. Supp. at 915.
55. Id. at 916.
56. See note 52 supra.
57. 517 F.2d at 951.
58. 449 U.S. at 518 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. 449 U.S. at 526 (quoting Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 166
(Rutledge, J., concurring)).
1982]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ernment had satisfied the first test of Chaunt because the true
facts would have resulted in denial of petitioner's citizen-
ship. 0 To Justice Blackmun, this interpretation of Chaunt
would strike a balance between the interest of the individual
and of the government in a denaturalization proceeding."
Justice White, dissenting, observed that the statute was
not entirely ambiguous and would therefore have the Court
clarify and apply the materiality standard established in
Chaunt.e2 He agreed with the court of appeals that to require
the government to prove that denial of citizenship was certain
would result in undue burden to the government and would
encourage aliens to falsify their applications for a visa or citi-
zenship. 8 The facts presented might have resulted in denial
of petitioner's citizenship and, therefore, the government sat-
isfied the second test in Chaunt."e
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, would interpret the Act
to disqualify only those who voluntarily assisted in perse-
cuting civilians.6 5 To interpret otherwise would be contrary to
the spirit of the DPA because under such construction even
those who, when under the most severe duress, assisted the
enemy would have no right to retain citizenship.6
Justice Stevens put forth still another interpretation of
Chaunt.6 7 In essence, he agreed that there was a need for ulti-
mate facts warranting a denial of citizenship. He proposed
that the only issue involved is the probability to be accorded
60. Id. at 521-22 nn. 6-8.
61. Id. at 522.
62. Id. at 528 (White, J. dissenting).
63. Id. at 529.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. Justice Stevens stated that
The district court refused to construe the statute to bar relief to any
person who assisted the enemy, whether voluntarily or not, however, be-
cause such a construction would have excluded the Jewish prisoners who
assisted the SS in the operation of the concentration camp. 455 F. Supp.
at 913. These prisoners performed such tasks as cutting hair of female
prisoners prior to their execution and performing in a camp orchestra as
a ruse to conceal the true nature of the camp.
67. 449 U.S. at 537. Justice Stevens' formulation of the Chaunt test is as fol-
lows: "There are really three inquiries, however: (1) whether a truthful answer would
have led to an investigation, (2) whether a disqualifying circumstance actually ex-
isted, and (3) whether it would have been discovered by the investigation." Justice
Stevens would put little or no weight on the third inquiry. Id.
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each of the components of the Chaunt test.68 Under his view,
Justice Stevens would consider a misstatement material if the
government could establish the existence of a disqualifying
fact that if it had been a truthful answer, more likely than
not, would have resulted in an investigation. 9 Because the
district court found that petitioner's service as an armed
guard was involuntary, the government had failed to prove
the existence of a disqualifying fact and, therefore, petitioner
should not be denaturalized.70
By virtue of Fedorenko, the lower courts now have a
guideline to follow in determining materiality when the mis-
representation was effected in applying for a visa. By the
same token, the creation of a multiple standard can only fur-
ther the confusion engendered by Chaunt because of the
Court's failure to provide any guidance as to the appropriate
interpretation. Consequently, the lower courts will most likely
continue to apply their respective views of Chaunt in denatu-
ralization proceedings until such time as the Court deems it
essential to create a standard of consistency. For the time be-
ing, the right of citizenship will take on a different form in
different degrees depending upon the particular jurisdictional
interpretation of Chaunt. As a result, denaturalization orders
will be entered indiscriminately.
Past Ninth Circuit decisions have interpreted Chaunt to
require that ultimate facts would have warranted denial of
citizenship and have applied this standard in both denaturali-
zation and deportation proceedings.1  The Court in
Fedorenko, citing Rossi v. United States,7s agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that in deportation proceedings the facts should
show at a minimum that a visa would have been denied. 8
Since denaturalization is deemed to have such grave conse-
quences on account of the precious right involved, it would
appear that the Court would exact an even higher standard of
materiality. This would be in accord with the Ninth Circuit's
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
72. 299 F.2d 650, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1962).
73. 449 U.S. at 509.
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interpretation of Chaunt.74
If and when the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Chaunt
is accepted, the naturalized citizen will be afforded the proper
protection in order to safeguard his or her rights. Otherwise,
such an individual will be reduced to a status below that of
the natural born citizen. Currently, there is a potential for dif-
ferential treatment even among naturalized citizens. Some can
be afforded more protection than others depending upon their
place of residence due to the different jurisdictional interpre-
tations of "Chaunt. Consequently, a standard of consistency
must be established in order to avoid indiscriminate orders of
citizenship. This can be accomplished by the Court through
its clarification of Chaunt.
Emma Pefta
74. La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
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WATER LAW-FEDERAL ACREAGE LIMITS
ON IRRIGATED LANDS ARE INAPPLICABLE
TO LANDS HAVING PRESENT PERFECTED
WATER RIGHTS IN THE IMPERIAL VALLEY-
Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
In 1901, the California Development Company began to
irrigate the Imperial Valley. This privately financed system
diverted water from the Colorado River through the Alamo
Canal into the Imperial Valley. With this irrigation, the Impe-
rial Valley evolved from an unproductive desert into produc-
tive farmland. I
A second privately financed company, Imperial Irrigation
District, assumed the water distribution duties in 1922. Con-
currently, the seven states surrounding the Colorado River,
including California, executed the Colorado River Compact
(Compact).2 The Compact was ratified and implemented by
the Boulder Canyon Project Act (Project Act)3 which was en-
acted by the United States Congress in 1928.
The courts have ruled on two provisions of the Project
Act: section 6 and section 14. Section 6 requires that the
works authorized by the Act must be used for "irrigation and
domestic uses and satisfaction of present perfected rights in
pursuance of Article VIII of [the] Colorado River compact."4
Section 14 provides that the Project Act is supplemental to
reclamation law and that "reclamation law shall govern the
construction, operation and management of the works, except
as otherwise therein provided."'
In section 12 the Project Act defines the applicable recla-
©1982 by Irene D. Gilbert
1. The value of agricultural products in the Imperial Valley increased from $4
in 1909 to approximately $200 million in 1965. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 356 n.2
(1980).
2. 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
3. Ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976)). The Project Act
was modified by the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act of 1940, ch. 643, 54
Stat. 779 (codified at U.S.C. § 618 (1976)).
4. Project Act § 6, 43 U.S.C. § 617(e) (Supp. III (1979)) (original version at ch.
42, § 6, 45 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1928)).
5. Id. § 14, 43 U.S.C. § 617(m) (1976) (original version at ch. 42, § 14, 45 Stat.
1057, 1065 (1928)).
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mation law as the Act of June 17, 1902 (Reclamation Act) in-
cluding amendments and supplements.' Section 46 of the Om-
nibus Adjustment Act of 1926' was one such amendment. It
prohibited delivery of reclamation project water to a parcel of
land which was greater than 160 acres if it was owned by one
individual. Owners were required to sell any land over the 160
acre limitation in order to receive water. The land was to be
sold at a price fixed by the Secretary of the Interior "on the
basis of its actual bona fide value at the date of appraisal
without reference to the proposed construction of the irriga-
tion works."8
Pursuant to the Project Act, the United States and the
Imperial Irrigation District entered into a contract for the
construction of the Imperial Dam and the All-American Canal
in 1932. The contract, like the Project Act, contained no ex-
press acreage limitation.' Hewes v. All Persons1" was brought
in California to confirm the validity of the contract.1" Secre-
tary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur submitted a letter to
the Hewes court indicating that the Reclamation Act's 160
acre limitation did not apply to Imperial Valley lands which
were currently cultivated and had a present water right.' The
Hewes court agreed with the Secretary's interpretation. The
contract was confirmed.18
The interpretation expressed by Secretary Wilbur re-
mained the official Department of the Interior view until 1964.
In 1964, the Department's Solicitor General declared that the
160 acre limitation should have applied to all privately owned
lands in the Imperial Valley. The United States then unsuc-
cessfully attempted to renegotiate its contract with the Impe-
rial Irrigation District in order to include the 160 acre limita-
tion. In 1967, the United States government sued the Imperial
6. Id. § 12, 43 U.S.C. § 617(k) (1976) (orginal version at ch. 42, § 12, 45 Stat.
1057, 1064 (1928)).
7. Ch. 383, 44 Stat. 636, 649 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 423(e) (1976)).
8. Id.
9. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 360.
10. No. 15.460 (Super. Ct., Imperial County, 1933). California law had certain
requirements for water district contracts to be effective. One method was for the
water district to submit the contract to the Superior Court for validation proceedings.
In the Hewes case, the court found and concluded that the 160 acre limitation did not
apply to project water and that California law had been completely satisfied.
11. Id.
12. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 362.
13. Id. at 363.
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Irrigation District seeking a declaratory judgment that the 160
acre limitation of section 46 of the Reclamation Act applied to
all privately owned lands within the District. The govern-
ment's suit included those parcels of land which had been re-
ceiving Colorado River water when the Project Act was passed
in 1929.14
The initial case in the United States District Court was
United States v. Imperial Irrigation District.5 The district
court allowed some landowners, representing the class of land-
owners holding more than 160 acres, to intervene as defen-
dants. Additionally, a group of nonlandowning residents, who
wished to purchase land should the limit apply, were amicus
curiae. The government argued that, although the Project Act
does not have an express acreage limitation, the incorporation
of reclamation law contained in section 14 and other provi-
sions of the Act mandated the application of section 46 of the
Omnibus Adjustment Act to delivery of water to the District's
landowners.' 6 The district court rejected this argument and
held that, because there was no express 160 acre limitation in
the Project Act, Congress did not intend to have it apply to
the Imperial Irrigation District.17 The court stressed that such
an important provision would have been explicit rather than
included only by indirect reference.18
The United States decided not to appeal the district
court's finding.' 9 The amicus curiae, however, led by Dr. Ben
Yellen, filed a protective order of appeal and sought leave to
intervene in United States v. Imperial Irrigation District.20
The group was largely composed of nonlandowning Imperial
Valley residents who had indicated a desire to purchase the
land which would probably be sold if the court held that the
160 acre limitation of section 46 applied to the District. The
14. Id. at 365.
15. 322 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id. at 18.
19. In a memorandum for the file, the Solicitor General emphasized the fact
that Secretary Wilbur's interpretation had been followed for thirty-eight years. He
indicated that an appeal should not be undertaken as it would not, and in his opinion
should not, be successful. The Solicitor General stated that such a longstanding ad-
ministrative interpretation should not be overturned. 126 CONG. REc. S. 1633 (daily
ed. Feb. 20, 1980).
20. 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
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district court denied their motion, and held that the class
lacked standing to intervene because they had not demon-
strated a present ability to purchase the lands. Additionally,
there was no guarantee that the excess acreage would be sold
to them; it could have been converted to nonagricultural
uses.
On appeal the case presented two major issues: whether
the Yellen group should be permitted to intervene, and
whether the 160 acre limitation should apply.2 2 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court and held that the Yellen group had the requisite
standing. The court also validated the protective order of ap-
peal.28 The court of appeals determined that the members of
the Yellen group had an interest as beneficiaries of section 46.
Further, the court noted that these were the type of interests
which that provision was designed to protect.24 The court in-
dicated that the Yellen group had a sufficient stake in the out-
come of the excess acreage dispute to intervene.2 5
The court of appeals also reversed the district court's de-
cision that the 160 acre limitation did not apply to the Impe-
rial Valley District.2 The Imperial Irrigation District, the
landowners holding more than 160 acres, and the State of
California filed petitions for writs of certiorari.2 The United
States Supreme Court then heard Bryant v. Yellen.2 8
21. Id. at 522-23.
22. Id. at 543. The court mistakenly believed, however, that the intervenors
were landowners, as they incorrectly referred to the Yellen group as "the interested
Imperial Valley landowners."
23. United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
24. Id. at 523.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 532-42. According to the court of appeals, section 46 and the Project
Act clearly required the application of the 160 acre limitation, and the language con-
tained in section 6 of the Project Act requiring satisfaction of present perfected water
rights referred to perfected rights owned by the Imperial Irrigation District in trust
for the landowners, not owned by the individual landowners. Thus, the court rea-
soned that to apply the 160 acre limitation would necessitate only a reallocation of
water and, therefore, would not impair any present perfected rights. The court deter-
mined that Secretary Wilbur's letter was "not entitled to any deference as a proper
construction of the Project Act and reclamation law." Id. at 540. Additionally, the
court stated that it would not base its decision on the administrative practice of
thirty-eight years of inaction, since the courts should not defer to inaction. The court
of appeals supported its opinion with a lengthy discussion of the statutory construc-
tion and legislative history of the Project Act. Id. at 526-36.
27. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366 (1980).
28. 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
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In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice White, the
Court upheld the court of appeals' decision that the Yellen
group could intervene 2 9 The Court, however, reversed in part
the decision that section 46 applied to the Imperial Valley
District.30
The Court first addressed the intervention issue. The dis-
trict court had denied intervention to the Yellen group on the
basis that they had shown no ability to purchase lands should
they become available and that, even if available, there was no
guarantee that the lands would be sold to them. Relying on
the harm/benefit test of Warth v. Seldin5 ' and the particular-
ized injury/remedy test of Bowker v. Morton, 2 the court of
appeals reversed the district court."
The Supreme Court's treatment of the intervention issue
29. Id. at 368.
30. Id. at 368-69.
31. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court denied standing to low in-
come plaintiffs who had sought to invalidate a town's zoning ordinance. In the opin-
ion, Justice Powell introduced a stricter test. Plaintiffs must allege: (1) specific facts
to show that they were harmed by the challenged practices of the defendant and (2)
that they would personally benefit from the court's intervention.
32. 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976). The facts in this case resemble those of Bry-
ant. Family farmers receiving water from a reclamation project brought suit to seek
application of the acreage limitation. The Bowker court did not reach the merits of
the case because they found that the plaintiffs lacked standing, based in part on the
decision in Warth. The court adopted a new test for standing: Plaintiffs must allege
(1) a particularized injury; (2) injury concretely and demonstratively resulting from
defendant's action; and (3) injury which will be redressed by the remedy sought. The
court found that the farmers had not met the standing test.
The Yellen group's appealable interest was the purchase of farmlands at prices to
be set in accordance with the dictates of section 46. The court of appeals found that
the Yellen group had met the Bowker test. The "particularized injury" alleged was
the higher prices of land that would be charged if the excess acreage limitation were
held to apply. The court of appeals also determined that the causation aspect of the
Bowker test was satisfied since the intervenors had alleged that because section 46
had not been applied, the landowners did not execute contracts to sell their excess
lands for the lower prices to be set by the government. Therefore, the court reasoned,
the prices will not decrease unless and until section 46 is enforced. Finally, the court
found that the remedy step of the test was satisfied. As a remedy, the Yellen group
asked that the court declare that section 46 applied. The court of appeals determined
that if section 46 did apply, it was more likely that most of the excess land would be
sold, rather than converted to agricultural use. If sold, it would be sold at lower
prices, assessed without reference to the reclamation project, and thus would be more
available to the intervenors. As beneficiaries of section 46, the Yellen group was
within the statute's zone of interest. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the
Yellen group had standing because they had satisfied the Worth and Bowker tests.
They had asserted an injury which could be redressed by application of section 46.
United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
33. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 368.
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was strikingly brief. The Court indicated that the court of ap-
peals had properly applied the standing cases. Justice White
reiterated that unless the Court held that section 46 applied;
it was unlikely that the excess lands would be sold at prices
lower than the current market values. Since it was more likely
that these lands would become available to the intervenors at
lower prices if section 46 were applied, the Yellen group was
held to have a "sufficient stake in the controversy to afford
them standing to appeal the district court's decision. '3 4
Policy consideration played a significant role in the Su-
preme Court's resolution of the intervention issue. The pur-
pose of reclamation law is to establish family-size farms. In a
footnote, the Court states: "This acreage limitation helps open
project lands to settlement by farmers of modest means, in-
sures wide distribution of the benefits of federal projects, and
guards against the possibility that speculators will earn wind-
fall profits from the increase in value of their lands resulting
from the federal project."3 Reclamation law was designed to
benefit just those people who sought to intervene in Bryant v.
Yellen. If the acre limitation of section 46 were held to apply,
it would assure wide distribution of those federal project ben-
efits by making land available to more people at lower prices.
The government had decided not to appeal the district
court holding that the 160 acre limitation did not apply to the
Imperial Valley lands. The Supreme Court could not have
overlooked the fact that the government, in effect, had re-
fused to pursue enforcement of the law which was intended to
benefit that class of people that had been denied the ability to
intervene. In fairness, the courts should permit the Yellen
group to intervene; this would allow them to protect the inter-
est that section 46 had given to them. Although the court in-
directly upheld the Bowker standing test as an elaboration of
their own Warth test, the policy of reclamation law and sec-
tion 46, as well as considerations of fairness, underlie the Su-
preme Court's holding with regard to the intervention issue.
The substantive issue in Bryant v. Yelen was whether
the 160 acre limitation applied to the parcels of land in the
Imperial Valley. Relying primarily on the concept of present
perfected rights, the Supreme Court determined that the 160
34. Id.
35. Id. n.19.
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acre limitation did not apply to certain lands." Article VIII of
the Colorado River Compact 7 recognized that the Imperial
Valley had present perfected rights to water. When the Pro-
ject Act was subsequently passed, section 6 mandated that the
reclamation works authorized were to be used for "irrigation
and domestic uses and satisfaction of present perfected rights
in pursuance of Article VIII of said Colorado River com-
pact."'8 To determine the extent of the present perfected
rights held by the Imperial Valley, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on Arizona v. California.9
In a subsequent decree, 0 the Court in Arizona defined a
present perfected right as "a water right acquired in accor-
dance with state law, which right has been exercised by the
actual diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been
applied to a defined area of land . ,.,"" Under this defini-
tion, lands which were irrigated prior to 1929, when the Pro-
ject Act became effective, have a present perfected right to
water. ' Interpreting the Arizona decree, the Bryant Court
subsequently held that the Project Act requires the Secretary
to satisfy perfected water rights."'
Applying the definition of present perfected rights devel-
oped in Arizona, the Bryant Court declared that the Imperial
Irrigation District has a present perfected right to water. The
determining factor was that water had been delivered to the
farms prior to 1929 without regard to size. Thus, the Court
reasoned, this present perfected right was equitably owned by
those people to whom the water was delivered prior to 1929.
36. Id. at 373-74.
37. Colorado River Compact, supra note 2, at 325.
38. Project Act § 6, 43 U.S.C. § 617(e) (Supp. III (1979)) (original version at ch.
42, § 6, 45 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1928)).
39. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
A conflict had developed between the Lower Basin states as to how the water
which was allocated to them in the Colorado River Compact, through the Project Act,
should be divided. The Supreme Court settled this issue as well as the related present
perfected rights question. In a supplemental decree, Arizona v. California, 439 U.S.
419 (1979) (per curiam), the Court declared that the Imperial Irrigation District had
a present perfected right to receive "annual quantities not to exceed (i) 2,600,000
acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water
necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 424,145
acres . . . ." Id. at 429.
40. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
41. Id. at 341.
42. Id.
43. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
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Since Arizona v. California requires the Secretary to satisfy
present perfected rights, the Court held that the government
cannot enforce the 160 acre limitation on any lands which
were irrigated by the District prior to 1929."4
The Court then briefly discussed the legislative history of
the Project Act. Although the court of appeals had relied
heavily on legislative history to reach a contrary result, the
Court concluded that there was nothing in the legislative his-
tory to indicate that their interpretation of the Project Act
was incorrect. Reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
legislative materials are not the most reliable indicators of
congressional intent. The Court further supported their inter-
pretation with the facts that Congress preserved present
rights in section 6 of the Project Act, and that the legislative
materials did not suggest that other provisions in the Project
Act were intended to apply the 160 acre limitation to lands
already receiving irrigation water.45
Finally, the Court discussed the "contemporary construc-
tion" of the Project Act adopted by the District and the
United States in the 1932 contract.46 Then Secretary of the
Interior Wilbur had written a letter indicating that, because
they had a present water right, the 160 acre limitation did not
apply to lands which were receiving District water prior to
1929. The Court stated that this view was adhered to, or at
least not formally contradicted, until 1964. The Court empha-
sized that the parties acted on the Secretary's interpretation.
Further, until 1964, neither the government nor the landown-
ers questioned whether the limitation applied to lands under
44. Id. at 373-74.
45. Id. at 374-77.
A collateral issue in Bryant v. Yellen concerned the applicability of state law
versus federal law. In Hewes v. All Persons, No. 15.460 (Super. Ct., Imperial County,
1933), the contract between the Imperial Irrigation District and the United States
government was affirmed and the court determined that the 160 acre limitation was
not applicable to the lands in the District. According to Arizona v. California, 376
U.S. at 343-44, this is the right which was acquired in accordance with state law. In
Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 371 n.22, the Court declared that the source of present
perfected rights is to be found in state law, but the question of whether the rights
provided by state law amount to present perfected rights within the meaning of sec-
tion 6 of the Project Act is one of federal law. The Court confirmed that the determi-
nation of whether the District's water rights are presently perfected under section 6 is
for the U.S. Supreme Court to decide. In this case, those rights belong to the land in
the District which was being irrigated prior to 1929.
46. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 377.
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irrigation in 1929.""
Although the Court only briefly discussed the parties' re-
liance on the contemporary construction, this was an impor-
tant consideration. Secretary Wilbur's interpretation re-
mained the official view of the United States for thirty-two
years. During that time, the Imperial Valley landowners acted
on the assumption that the 160 acre limitation did not apply
to their parcels of land. As a result of their efforts, the Impe-
rial Valley has become a productive agricultural area.
Though it was not explicit in its discussion, the Supreme
Court could not overlook considerations of reliance/estoppel
and fairness to the landowners. In addition, the Court must
have considered the potentially harmful effect of imposing the
160 acre limitation.
Today, there are 14,000 acres under irrigation in the Im-
perial Valley which were not being irrigated in 1929."" Since
the Court's decision was based on perfected rights it does not
affect these parcels of land. The issue with respect to the
14,000 acres was remanded to the lower court.50 The question
of whether the 160 acre limitation applies to the 14,000 acres
is left unanswered. The Supreme Court expressly did not
adopt the district court rationale which would have exempted
all the lands in the Imperial Irrigation District, without regard
to lands irrigated prior to 1929. Nor did the Court accept the
court of appeals holding that the 160 acre limit applies to the
entire District.
The Supreme Court provided the lower court with some
guidance in resolving any remaining controversy concerning
the 14,000 acres. The district court could: (1) declare that the
160 acre limit applies to the remaining acreage because it was
not irrigated in 1929 and thus has no present perfected rights;
or (2) determine that the 160 acre limitation does not apply
because the contemporary construction of the Wilbur letter
provided that the limitation was inapplicable; or (3) reason
that since section 46 has been found inapplicable to the 1929
lands by the Supreme Court, Congress did not intend the
acreage limitation to have any application in the Imperial Irri-
gation District.
47. Id. at 377-78.
48. Id. at 356 n.2.
49. Id. at 379.
50. Id. at 380.
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In Bryant v. Yellen, the Court was confronted with diffi-
cult and controversial issues. The Court had to determine if
Congress intended the Project Act to impose the 160 acre lim-
itation on the Imperial Irrigation District. The Court also had
to consider that the limit, if it did apply, had not been en-
forced for thirty-two years. Naturally, policy and fairness con-
siderations played a major role. The Court addressed the
strong policy of the reclamation law to assist the family
farmer61 in its resolution of the Yellen group's intervention is-
sue. By allowing the Yellen group to intervene, the Court gave
recognition to the policy of reclamation law and assured some
fairness in its application. The Court, however, was also con-
fronted with the question of fairness to the Imperial Valley
landowners, who had relied on Secretary Wilbur's interpreta-
tion and on government inaction for thirty-two years. The
Court assured some fairness to them by declaring that the 160
acre limitation was inapplicable to the 424,145 acres irrigated
prior to 1929.
The only question that the Court left unanswered was
whether the 160 acre limit applies to the 14,000 acres which
were irrigated after 1929. By providing the lower courts with
some answers to that question, the Court has left bpen the
possibility that the Yellen group and reclamation law policy
will prevail.
In Bryant v. Yellen, the United States Supreme Court
walked a thin line between the divergent interests of the Yel-
len group and the landowners, yet managed to assure some
fairness to each group. The Court provided no definite an-
swers concerning the 14,000 acres. In settling the controversy
concerning the other 424,145 acres, however, the Court ad-
dressed the most complicated and politically controversial as-
pects of the case.
The 160 acre limitation issue was before the Court be-
cause, in the Project Act, Congress did not clarify whether or
not section 46 would apply to the Imperial Irrigation District.
In the final footnote to the case, Justice White writes that:
"We note, further, that there has passed the Senate and is
pending in the House a measure that would exempt lands in
the District from the reach of acreage limitations in the recla-
51. 35 CONG. REc. 6677 (1902).
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mation law."52 Perhaps the Court is hoping that Congress will
resolve the question concerning the 14,000 acres and relieve
the courts of that task.
Irene D. Gilbert
52. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 380 n.32.
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